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SYMPOSIUM ON THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOLS
INTRODUCTION
by
HAMILTON DESAUSSURE*
The Geneva Protocols of 1977 reflect the latest attempt by governments
to revise and confirm the law of armed conflict. Their fundamental
significance lies in the fact that over one hundred nations considered the sub-
ject of such importance that they took the time and expense to participate in
the four year long negotiations. The four sessions of the Conferences were
periodically convened from 1974 to 1977. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) in 1971 and 1972 limited experts to Geneva to draft a
Model Convention on the Law on Armed Conflicts. It was this draft which
provided the impetus for the Swiss Government to convene a diplomatic Con-
ference in Geneva in 1974.
Nations, like individuals, are motivated by self interest when they take on
the burden of added constraints freely entered into by agreement. In the case
of nations, of course, it is national self interest. It is perhaps startling to realize
that nations with such diverse social systems and ideologies as the United
States, the U.S.S.R., China, Syria, Israel, North Vietnam, East Germany, and
the countries of the European Economic Community could even agree to sit
down together at Geneva and hammer out an international agreement on the
law of armed conflict. The fact that the representatives from so many states
could reach agreement and sign the final Act, on 10 June 1977, is even more
amazing. It is true that very few nations have ratified Protocol One or Protocol
Two, yet most of the nations which participated in the Conference, including
all of the above mentioned countries who did sign the Final Act ad referen-
dum, will attempt to comply with the principal provisions of Protocol One.
There is general agreement that the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907, while still technically in force, have been made largely obsolete by
technological advance in weapons systems, communications, air power, and
the ballistic missile. Yet the fundamental axiom that acts of war should not
cause unnecessary or disproportionate suffering with regard to the military ad-
vantage to be gained, remains unchanged from those early conventions. What
is new in the Protocols of 1977 is the added emphasis placed on the protection
of the civilian population, not only in occupied areas held by the enemy, but
also for the protection of civilians in the homeland. It cannot be doubted that
virtually all nations accept the premise that there are legal restraints on the use
of force in time of military engagements. It is in the interests of all belligerents,
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as well as neutral countries, to have these restraints spelled out in a formal and
widely accepted agreement.
The dilemma, which was constantly being confronted by the delegates at
the four sessions of the Geneva Conference on the Additional Protocols, was
how to gain a widespread consensus updating and developing the
humanitarian law pertaining to international armed conflict without diluting
the efficacy of the rules. For example, how to best protect the civilian popula-
tion from the devastation of military operations without placing unacceptable
limitations on military operations. As in the case of all multilateral negotia-
tions involving a large number of nations with dissimilar and often opposing
viewpoints, the drafting process entails compromise and some ambiguity. The
end product is not a succinct, unequivocal document with a clarity few could
misinterpret. Rather the final agreement reflects a negotiated solution where
all of the parties or blocs make adjustments by giving up some demands and
making concessions. For example, many western countries objected to any
reference to "peoples (who) are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes." It was the view of western countries
that the concept of just and unjust wars might tend to weaken the rules of con-
duct which are to apply with equal force to all belligerents. However, the
United States and its allies ultimately consented to the inclusion of this phrase
in the Protocol.
Prohibitions against attacks upon dams or dikes also generated controver-
sy at the conference as to how this prohibition was to be applied. For example,
under what conditions should these targets be immune? Under what condi-
tions could they be considered legal military objectives?
Prohibitions inserted in Protocol One against indiscriminate attacks on
the civilian population also required compromises between those countries
likely to be the primary users of air power and those who perceived themselves
as the object of air attack. Deliberately vague language as to certain provisions
was required in order to achieve the ultimate goal of securing a revised and
more humanitarian law regulating international armed conflict. Diplomats,
who for the most part negotiated these Protocols, are not unlike lawyers. They
do not wish to waste their time in fruitless and unsuccessful negotiations. Nor
do they wish to cause expense to their clients, the governments to which they
are accredited, in unproductive proceedings. Most informed and objective
observers believe that the new Protocols do represent a major step in
regulating conduct in modern armed conflict. However, there is much less con-
sensus on the issue of their acceptance and ratification as an integral docu-
ment. Even with the possibility of reservations being annexed, some commen-
tators believe their acceptance as binding on a belligerent could impose too
great a limitation on a belligerent's armed forces.
[Vol. 19:4
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The ratification process can pose a far more formidable obstacle to a trea-
ty's coming into force than the actual negotiation and conclusion of the agree-
ment itself. The United States Senate, which must give its advice and consent
before any treaty can come into force in the United States, is well-known for its
failure to give its consent to many seemingly meritorious treaties. Moreover
there are numerous treaties which have been signed by United States delegates
to international conferences which, for one reason or another, have never been
submitted to the Senate for their advice and consent. The Geneva Protocols of
1977, at this date, fall into the latter category. They are still being studied by
various branches of the government, most especially the Departments of
Defense and State, as to whether their submission to the Senate should be
recommended to the President. At this time, May 1986, it appears as if no
recommendation will be made and that the Protocols will be placed on the
bureaucratic shelf.
The purpose of the symposium held at The University of Akron Law
School in November 1985 was to elicit a discussion among some of the most
knowledgeable scholars and governmental experts on the merits of Protocol
One, and the advantages and disadvantages to the United States in becoming a
party to that agreement. Each of the participants, whether from offices within
the United States, such as the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, or from international institutions such as the International Committee
of the Red Cross, have given their individual views, which are not necessarily
representative of their offices or agencies. Nevertheless, it has been my ex-
perience, over approximately twenty-eight years of government service, that
the views of these individuals generally do not deviate in material detail from
the tentative or prospective positions of the offices from which they come. If
this hypothesis is correct in this case, and it is only my assumption that it is,
then Protocol One may be on the shelf for some time to come.
Even if this be so, unratified international agreements can frequently
become part of a new and developing customary law. When nations become
belligerents they frequently tacitly accept the rules, or most of them, which
have been hammered out with some care at an international conference in
which they participated. For example, the 1923 Draft Hague Rules of Aerial
Warfare were never formally adopted by states, but they were used as a guide
to the Navy in World War II and are frequently cited in the Air Force pam-
phlet on the Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. At the minimum,
there is tacit acceptance by belligerents to those unratified rules which are
generally perceived as creating new and better standards for the reduction of
unnecessary suffering and the improved protection of civilians and civilian
property as well as military personnel hors de combat. The new rules for the
protection of medical aircraft, for the search for missing and dead persons, and
for the greater restraints on aerial bombing would seem to fall within the
category of those rules which will become part of the customary law of war,
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even if not formally ratified. Other more specific examples, such as the im-
munities conferred on descending parachutists who have escaped from aircraft
in distress, and rules for the greater protection of the environment, could also
be cited as emerging or accepted rules of customary international law.
To the extent that uniformly recognized principles embodied in Protocol
One have not already been incorporated into field manuals and instructions of
the armed forces of the signatory states, they will undoubtedly be brought into
them as new instructions to the field are issued. As belligerents begin to incor-
porate the updated rules in their new manuals and rules of engagement, the
substance of the Protocols themselves will reflect the modern law of armed
conflict. Not all its provisions will be accepted as binding on belligerents, but,
in essence, it will become the point of reference as to the legal restraints on the
use of military force.
On balance, the rules comprise a much needed modernization of the rules
for better protection of civilians and civilian objects, for the elimination of un-
necessary suffering, and for the conservation of the earth's natural resources
and the preservation of the environment. Perhaps it is not too unrealistic to ac-
cept the Protocols, whether or not ratified by a significant number of States, as
improving the conditions under which armed conflicts take place, while
awaiting the day when wars and battles are no longer common occurrences.
[Vol. 19:4
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